Dr. Bhat was tasked by AMC headquarters as Project Officer of the Analysis of Transuranics in Depleted Uranium Project. The project's goals are to assess levels of TRU in DU for the Army's DU Armor license and characterize the risk in terms of relative increase in Annual Limits on Intake (ALI). In order to accomplish this objective, Dr. Bhat consulted with the NRC license holder and Army agencies including the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USA CHPPM). Collectively, the agencies designed a quality assurance program establishing guidelines to be followed by the designated laboratories during the analysis of TRU in DU Armor. Highlights of the established criteria are listed below. Each selected laboratory should have: -The capability to analyze one spiked TRU in uranium sample prior to sample analysis. -The capability to obtain a Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) of 1 pCi of TRU/g of DU.
-Laboratory procedures which are well established and published in the literature. 3 Dr. Ramachandra Bhat traveled to the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) to visit the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) and the Radiological and Environmental Science Laboratory (RESL). Dr. Bhat reviewed INTEC's established quality assurance program and subsequently determined that their assistance would be beneficial to the DU Armor project and designated INTEC as the primary laboratory. A secondary laboratory, RESL (RESL evaluates the performance of DOE laboratories by administering a QC program called MAPEP), was designated as an additional laboratory to verify the analytical performance of INTEC, the primary laboratory. QC measures established by RESL include the production of TRU spiked standards in a uranium matrix for the performance evaluation of INTEC.
As a QC measure, Dr. Bhat requested that 10% of the samples analyzed by INTEC be analyzed by RESL. Dr. Bhat established the Video Teleconference (VTC) format as the forum for a collaborative decisionmaking process involving participants from DOE, INTEC, RESL, DA, and Air Force officials (who were observers). VTCs took place in November and December 1999 and January 2000. In each VTC session, QA was granted the highest priority to obtain the credibility of the TRU in DU Armor values reported by INTEC.
SAMPLE PREPARATION AND LOGISTICS
DOE shipped DU billets to a contractor, Specific Manufacturing Capability (SMC) located in Idaho Falls, Idaho. SMC produced the DU armor from DU billets.
DU armor is shipped from SMC to Lima Tank Plant for insertion into tank s. SMC ships the scraps from armor production to another contractor, Starmet Inc., in Boston, MA. This is then melted and recast into billets and is then sent back to SMC. During recycling of nuclear fuel, TRUs and long-lived fission products entered the DU stream.
The Army decided to analyze, both quantitatively and qualitatively, random samples from three different generations, or populations, of finished billets. Population #1 is comprised of billets from the original shipment of DU Armor. Scraps from the production process are melted and recast into billets. Population #2 contains billets recast from Population #1. Population #3 contains billets recast from the production of Population #2. This process of recasting scrap is the reason no additional DU Armor has been added to the process since the first shipment.
At the request of TACOM, DOE prepared three sets of sixty billet samples. Samples from Population #1 billets were taken at SMC. Two samples were taken from each billet selected, one inch removed from the edges of the long face of each billet. Two samples, one from each end of the billet, were taken to assess the homogeneity of the billet. The samples were obtained by drilling at an approximately 1" depth and collecting 40g of DU turnings, or shavings, per sample. Because DU is highly pyrophoric, the drilling had to be done with the block submerged in a coolant comprised of water and Trimor. A fresh drill bit was used for each end of each block to eliminate the possibility of cross-contamination. Starmet Inc. archived one-inch cubes taken from the top crop of Population #2 and #3 billets. The selected cubes were sent to SMC for sampling. The sampling of these cubes was performed as described above for Population #1 billet samples. When the three sets of sixty were completed, SMC shipped one set of 60 samples to INTEC; the second set was designated for AMC; and the third set was put into storage for future research. 4 
SAMPLE ANALYSIS STRATEGY
The sixty samples designated for INTEC are the primary focus of this study. The samples were comprised of 20 Population #1 (the first population was the initial 12 million pounds of DU Armor billets cast at Fernald) billet samples, 30 samples from Population #2 (the second population is the 2992 first recycle billets) billets and 10 samples from Population #3 (the third population is the second recycle billets which were/are produced from recycling first recycle scrap) billets. The Army's sampling strategy was designed to simultaneously create a statistically representative sampling of the DU Armor production lot from 1986 to present and to be cost effective. In order to accomplish this objective, a professional statistician was consulted to select 60 total samples from 3 populations 1 . After selection was complete, the samples were distributed among two separate laboratories. INTEC, the primary laboratory employed, received and analyzed all 60 samples. RESL, a DOE laboratory, received 8 out of the 60 total samples allocated for AMC. Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) information were collected from INTEC along with the results of sample analysis 2 . The QA/QC data collected allow for a realistic interpretation of the sample analysis results. The accuracy of each laboratory's analysis may be determined from its long-term performance in routine QA/QC checks and from results of spiked sample analysis tailored to this study. QA/QC information will be more fully discussed in subsequent sections.
SAMPLE ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
The samples, as discussed above, were drilled from the sides of randomly selected billets or archived cubes. In order to prepare the samples for radiological analysis, the solid DU Armor turnings/shavings were first dissolved in nitric acid. Subsequently, this solution, presumably a mixture of nitric acid, DU Armor and any transuranics present, was poured through a column containing an extraction chromatography resin designed to absorb any TRU in the liquid solution. The solution eluted from the column, therefore, would contain only nitric acid and transuranics, facilitating their detection via an alpha spectrometry system or mass spectrometry. INTEC utilized the extraction chromatography method to separate TRU from DU Armor and quantitatively analyzed TRU by using alpha spectroscopy and Inductively Coupled Plasma (ICP) mass spectrometry. RESL separated TRU from DU Armor by the coprecipitation method and quantitatively analyzed TRU by alpha spectrometry. Both methods are wellestablished standard laboratory procedures. As dissolution of the turnings in nitric acid could potentially be incomplete due to the presence of refractory plutonium, aliquots from 16 of the 60 total samples were filtered through a 0.2-micron laboratory filter by INTEC. The residue was separated for use in plutonium analysis (Pu-238 and Pu-239/240). The dissolution residue was combined with lithium tetraborate in a process labeled lithium tetraborate fusion to facilitate the dissolution of plutonium 3 . At the conclusion of lithium tetraborate fusion, the samples were handled as above, by utilizing an alpha spectrometry system to analyze for 5 plutonium. A comparison of analysis results between the samples prepared using lithium tetraborate fusion and the samples being prepared by dissolution in nitric acid was performed. There was no difference in the levels of Plutonium detected. It was therefore concluded that the DU Armor turnings did not contain refractory plutonium and that regular preparation of dissolution in nitric acid would be sufficient for the purposes of this study.
Additionally, because Pu-236, Am-243 and Pu-242 are often used as tracers in alpha spectrometry analysis, RESL analyzed DU Armor samples for the presence of these isotopes. RESL's methodology dissolved 2 g of DU Armor samples in nitric acid and performed alpha spectrometry analysis focusing on the tracer isotopes. With an MDC of approximately 0.2 pCi/g of DU, RESL's analysis showed no Pu-236, Am-243 or Pu-242 in DOE DU Armor samples. Pu-236, Pu-242 and Am-243 were therefore deemed suitable tracers for this study.
TRU IN DU RADIOCHEMISTRY RESULTS
INTEC results for Population #1 billets, indicate that Am-241, Np-237, Pu-238, Pu-239/240 and Tc-99 were present in DU Armor only in amounts well below the interim values set forth by the interim license amendment. The lowest and highest activity concentrations for each nuclide are as follows: 
GAMMA SPECTROSCOPIC ANALYSIS OF DU BILLETS
Tc-99, a fission product, was detected in approximately 50% of DU billets analyzed. The U.S. Army took a proactive approach and requested that INTEC analyze the DU Armor samples for other possible fission products by gamma spectrometric analysis. An aliquot of DU Armor sample solution was counted on a High Purity, high-resolution gamma spectrometric system. Given the age of the DU Armor, only gamma emitters with a half-life greater than 2.5 years were considered. No gamma peaks were observed except for the uranium progeny.
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QUALITY CONTROL
INTEC INTERNAL QC
The approach to QC in this study was two -fold; both internal and external checks were established to ensure accurate results. Initial laboratory selection was of paramount importance, and long-term QC records were consulted for each laboratory under consideration. The above LCS were analyzed with each batch of 6-10 DU Armor samples at the same time.
In addition to the LCS analyzed for each batch, an isotopic tracer was added to each DU Armor sample analyzed for the TRU isotopes. The tracer isotopes used were Am-243, Np-239, Pu-236, and Pu-242. A certified amount of each of the above isotopes with a known activity was added to each DU Armor sample prior to chemical separation. The tracers are chemically identical to the target isotopes and therefore indicate the losses incurred from the separation process. By measuring the amount of tracer activity in the final sample counted and comparing to the tracer added, a chemical yield can be calculated. This yield factor is then used to correct the final value of the target isotope. Correcting this value allowed INTEC to provide a more accurate estimate of TRU activity in DU Armor.
A third QC sample analyzed with each batch of billet samples was called a "Uranium Matrix Control" and included a pure uranium matrix and known amounts of the following isotopes: Am-241, Pu-239/240, and Np-237. This control was utilized to determine the effectiveness of the ion exchange process in separating the target isotopes from the bulk uranium matrix. The control yield for all isotopes generally fell within the 90-110% range, indicating that the ion exchange process was quite effective.
INTEC LABORATORY MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATIONS
The detection limit set by the DA analysis protocol was 1 pCi/g of DU Armor sample. The MDC levels achieved by INTEC were approximately one order of magnitude lower than the requested value. Most of the MDC results were close to 0.1 pCi/g of DU Armor sample. Therefore, the methodologies achieved appropriate levels of sensitivity.
EXTERNAL QC
As discussed above, RESL participated in this study in order to provide analysis results to compare with those from INTEC. RESL received 8 of the total 60 samples, including 3 samples from Population #1, 3 samples from Population #2, and 2 samples from Population #3. Data comparisons can be found below. MDCs achieved by each lab for the compared samples can found in Table 9 . Variability exists between INTEC and RESL analysis results and MDCs achieved. These differences may be due to different methodologies employed and for possible sample inhomogeneities.
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PROPAGATION OF ERRORS
Analysis of TRU in DU Armor required several critical chemical/ion exchange separations and different types of counting methods to estimate the quantities of each nuclide of TRU contained in DU Armor. A sample batch consisted of 8-10 DU Armor samples that were analyzed simultaneously. A tracer was added to each sample to estimate the chemical yield of the tracer at the end of the sample analysis. Also, a LCS was run along with the sample batch to obtain the yield of the control samples. In addition, a TRU-spiked Uranium sample was analyzed with the sample batch to monitor the chemical separation in Uranium Matrix. All yields were utilized to compute sample uncertainty values. Typical hand calculated samples of the propagation of errors for RESL and INTEC are given in Appendices E and F, respectively.
DISCUSSION
As mentioned above, the QA program established by DA for the investigation of TRU in DU Armor samples was quite extensive. Apart from the usual quality control of instrumentation, methodology, standard operating procedures, duplicate analysis, and sample chains of custody, DA has employed two separate laboratories in this investigation of TRU in DU Armor for quality assurance purposes. Both laboratories have an excellent record of participation in the DOE-monitored QAP and MAPEP programs. In this study, however, some apparent variabilities exist between INTEC and RESL analysis results. Finally, the litmus test for QA in this study was the excellent performance of INTEC in blind spiked analysis of TRU in uranium as displayed in Table 10 .
The population #1 billets have the following dimensions 16" x 18" x 2". Two samples were taken from each random billet as shown in Appendix A to check the homogenous distribution of TRU and Tc-99 in DU Armor. TRU and Tc -99 in DU Armor of the top and bottom sections of these 10 random billets agree well within experimental error. This agreement indicates that TRU and Tc-99 are distributed uniformly in the DU Armor billets. Hence, similar comparison of top and bottom sections of the DU Armor billets is not carried out in population #2 and #3 DU Armor billets.
The results of this analysis indicate, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that Am-241, Np-237, Pu-238 and Pu-239/240 content in DU Armor is minimal. The TRU levels that have been detected are similar across all three populations.
The results of this analysis indicate that Tc-99 content in DU Armor slightly exceeded the interim value for two samples out of 60 samples analyzed.
TRU IN CONTEXT
An assessment was undertaken to determine the extent of increased radiological health and safety risk associated with trace amounts of TRU in the DU Armor. As TRU and Tc-99 emit particulate radiation (alpha, beta and low energy photons) and the DU Armor is encased in steel, the presence of trace amounts of TRU in DU Armor should not result in a measurable difference in external dose. This conclusion is consistent with a previous DOE safety analysis review 5 .
In order to assess internal dose, the percent increase in risk (in fractions of Annual Limit on Intake (ALIs)) due to the interim maximum value of TRU (100 pCi of Am-241, 100 pCi of Np-237, 100 pCi of Pu-238, 100 pCi of Pu-239/240) and Tc-99 (500 pCi) for 1 g of inhaled DU Armor was calculated and compared to the ALI calculated for 1 g of inhaled DU Armor.
The ALIs used in the following equations are listed below in The specific activity of 1 g of DU is 3. In the above equation, if 10,000 pCi of Tc -99 is used in place of 500 pCi of Tc -99, the total percentage of TRU and Tc-99 ALI still equals 0.073. There is no change in the percent ALI because the ALI of Tc-99 is 7X10 8 pCi.
The corresponding mass concentration for interim maximum TRUs and Tc -99 are given in Table  12 . 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As evidenced by the risk analysis approach employed above, the interim values of 100 pCi/g of each TRU and 500 pCi/g Tc-99 result in an increase of only 0.8% to the overall occupational risk as measured by ALI. None of the TRU values identified by analysis of 60 DU Armor samples from three different populations of billets approached 100 pCi/g. The maximum TRU value was 19 ± 5.8 pCi/g of Am-241 in population #2, well below the interim value of 100 pCi/g. However, two samples out of 60 DU Armor billets slightly exceeded the interim value of 500 pCi/g for Tc-99. But as evidence by the percentage ALI TRU and Tc-99 equation shows, even an increase to 10,000 pCi/g of Tc-99 will not increase the overall occupational risk above 0.8%. Even though two samples out of 60 DU Armor billets had Tc-99 values greater than 500 pCi/g (510 ± 30 pCi/g and 540 ±32 pCi/g), the overall occupational risk (as represented by the ALI) still will not exceed 0.8%.
It is also important to underscore that the radiation protection program currently in place in support of the DU Armor program also adequately protects against these minute quantities of TRU and Tc-99.
Therefore, the presence of these trace radionuclides in DU Armor is safe. Where: 
